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to help to build up his fallen state. His letters and addresses after the war were marked by the same spirit. "I would not enslave the colored people again if I could," he said; "I am more than convinced now that slavery is so great a national weakness if not wickedness that it should never be tolerated by any people who would themselves be free." So he came to feel that the war, inevitable, had been providential. As he worked hard, an old man, for his daily bread, so he urged young Virginians to be high-minded and generous, as their fathers had been, but to be just before being generous and to rejoice in the necessity of toil. He had been left an orphan at the age of six and spoke of himself as a self-willed boy. Through life he was impulsive. Noticeable for his abstinence from liquor, at a time when drinking was common, he was yet intemperate in the use of tobacco. His chief faults, to the world, were his lack of balance, his intemperance of speech.

In reading this life of Wise and its touches of Virginia history, our horizon of thought constantly widens; and we feel afresh that without the careful study of local conditions, the history of a nation cannot be written justly.

JEFFREY R. BRACKETT.

*General Sherman.* By GENERAL MANNING F. FORCE. [The Great Commanders Series, edited by James Grant Wilson.] (New York: D. Appleton and Co. 1899. Pp. ix, 353.)

GENERAL FORCE was one of the best selections that could have been made from the leading officers of the Army of the Tennessee to write the history of General Sherman. An excellent officer, a close student of the war, a clear and fair writer and an intimate friend, he was well equipped for obtaining the needed material and using it with effect. It is a matter for serious regret that ill health compelled him to commit the writing of the important chapters upon the Atlanta Campaign, the Development of the March to the Sea, and the Post-Bellum Period to Gen. J. D. Cox, since the latter has in these chapters repeated certain material errors to which he has heretofore committed himself in his writings.

The period of General Sherman's life before the war is necessarily presented by General Force in compact form, but it is the most successful effort of the kind yet made. The same may properly be claimed for the chapter on the beginning of the war. In this Sherman's brilliant conduct at Bull Run is brought out in new light, a single sentence telling the story, that of the entire Union loss of "481 killed and 1111 wounded, Sherman's brigade lost 111 killed and 205 wounded."

The chapter on the battle of Shiloh is the most thorough study of that engagement yet printed. The author admits that "General Johnston marched his army out of Corinth, and on Saturday deliberately put it into camp, arranged in lines of attack, within a few miles of the National picket lines without any one in the National camp having a suspicion of that fact, though there were some who were satisfied there was a large force in front." The case is summed up in this quotation

from General Rawlins: "We did not expect to be attacked in force that morning, and were surprised that we were, but we had sufficient notice before the shock came, to be under arms and ready to meet it." Those who have heretofore contended that the enemy ran over the Union camps while men were still asleep in their tents or at breakfast, will be surprised at the strength of the evidence which the author brings from the records to show "that no camp was entered before nine o'clock, and, excepting Prentiss's, none was entered before ten o'clock; and, further, that no camp was entered before a serious engagement in which the assailants suffered repulse before prevailing." The map of the battlefield does not agree in important locations of troops, either with the map adopted by Grant, or the one filed by Sherman with his official report. It does not clearly bring out the fact that in the occupation of Pittsburgh Landing the troops were camped with little regard to either main or supporting lines of battle. The other maps of the volume are sufficient for the full explanation of the text.

The story of the operations upon the Mississippi about Memphis and Vicksburg is clearly told, and Sherman's part effectively presented. Being Grant's greatest strategic campaign, the subject well deserves a volume. It is treated, however, by Gen. Force as well as the space at his command would permit.

The narrative of movements in the three days' battles about Chattanooga is alive with interest. It perpetuates, however, several very material errors which have been often corrected by the official record. A reader would suppose that Gen. Sherman successfully executed his orders to carry the north end of Missionary Ridge to the railroad tunnel—this being the key-movement of Grant's plan of battle. On the contrary, through a failure to make reconnoissance, he occupied instead a detached range of hills without opposition. The next day, the enemy having in the meantime occupied the ground in force, he was unable to carry the desired point, though fighting desperately to attain it. The ancient assertion is repeated that the enemy's centre, fronting the Army of the Cumberland, was depleted to strengthen the combination against Sherman, while as a matter of fact, not a soldier or a gun went from that centre towards Sherman during the battle. This misconception arose from the movements of the troops which had occupied Lookout Mountain the day before, being transferred during the forenoon to Bragg's extreme right near Sherman. The credit of planning the Brown's Ferry operation for opening the line of supplies is given to Gen. W. F. (Baldy) Smith, when the official records show conclusively that the plan was formed by Gen. Rosecrans, before Gen. Smith reached the western army. To the latter officer belongs the credit of arranging the details, and brilliantly executing the movement when it was committed to his hands.

Gen. Cox, in scholarly form, sets forth the multitudinous movements of the Atlanta campaign in clear outline. But he obscures Gen. Sherman's failure to promptly turn Johnston's position at Dalton, by a movement in force to the rear of it by way of Snake Creek Gap, which was

early discovered to be unoccupied, and through which Gen. Thomas urged that he might throw his army. Gen. Cox also defends the assault on Kennesaw Mountain at considerable length. This, beyond question, was a grave blot on the long campaign to Atlanta. On this point, in opposition to Gen. Cox's view, it is sufficient to say that Gen. Thomas, Gen. McPherson, and Gen. Schofield, the three commanders of Sherman's armies, strongly condemned the assault as needless, as did also most of the corps commanders.

In treating of the Development of the March to the Sea General Cox ignores the fact, now fully made known by the discovery and printing in the War Records *Atlas* of General Grant's map sent to General Sherman before the Atlanta campaign began, which map demonstrates that General Grant originated a march to the sea to follow the capture of Atlanta. It is true that Sherman's plan differed from Grant's in that the latter contemplated the preliminary defeat of Hood's army.

General Force gives an excellent account of the March to the Sea, and the subsequent wonderful campaign through the Carolinas, but touches very lightly upon the wholly unnecessary escape of Hardee with his ten thousand from Savannah, which caused such sore dissatisfaction at Washington. Again, the reader does not receive any impression of the fact that Sherman's army was in great peril of being defeated in detail in its closing battle at Bentonville. The chapter by General Force on the Sherman terms for Johnston's surrender is the best account in condensed form yet published. It fails, however, to take note of the fact that those terms, in nearly all their essentials, were drafted by John H. Reagan, the Confederate Postmaster-General. His original draft of these terms has been in the possession of the War Department since the close of the war.

It is the final chapter by General Cox, entitled Post-Bellum, which will cause the student of the war to most sharply regret that General Force had not been able to write the entire volume. While it might not have been more readable, it would have been free from insidious efforts to sustain previous unfair estimates of General Thomas by private letters which will not stand the test of the official records. It is unfortunate that a volume so entertaining, and excellent in the main, and especially that so interesting and valuable a closing chapter should be marred by such errors as have been pointed out in this brief review, and which a competent editing with the open official record at hand would so easily have avoided.

*Thaddeus Stevens.* BY SAMUEL W. MCCALL. [American Statesmen.] (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Co. 1899. Pp. vi, 369.)

If there is ground for supposing that the editor of the "American Statesmen" series had to cope with certain doubts and questionings before including Stevens in the list of subjects, it is beyond all controversy that the result has vindicated the wisdom of his decision. Mr. McCall has produced as judicious and useful a volume as any in the series.